Crystal Palace and the UEFA MCO Rules: Clipping the Eagles Wings?
- Mark O'Neill
- 7 minutes ago
- 6 min read
⚽ Understanding UEFA’s “Controlling Influence” Rule in Multi-Club Ownership
As football club ownership becomes increasingly global, multi-club ownership (MCO) models are on the rise. But for clubs hoping to compete in UEFA competitions, ownership structures can create conflicts that threaten eligibility, as can be seen with the recent controversy surrounding Crystal Palace’s threatened expulsion from European competition due to Eagle Football having ownership stakes in both Palace and Olympique Lyon (OL). In addition to this, David Blitzer, one of the main shareholders in Eagle Football, has a separate 51% stake in Brøndby, which has qualified for the Conference League.
UEFA’s Multi-Club Ownership (MCO) rules are designed to safeguard the integrity of European football, and central to those rules is the concept of “controlling influence.”
But what exactly does “controlling influence” mean? How does UEFA define it, and what kinds of ownership or operational structures trigger it?
This article breaks down the rules in plain English, helping clubs, investors, and fans understand what’s at stake.
Who Owns Crystal Palace?
Crystal Palace is owned by 43% minority owned by Eagle Football Ltd, which in turn is majority owned by John Textor, an American businessman. Eagle Football Ltd owns 45% of the shares in Crystal Palace, as well as 77% in OL, and controlling stakes in RWD Molenbeek in Belgium and Botafogo in Brazil. His ownership in OL and Botafogo has been somewhat controversial, with recent spats with the Qatari owners of PSG and the Brazilian FA after accusations of corruption and conflicts of interest.
The other primary shareholders in Palace are Josh Harris, who holds 18%, David Blitzer, who holds 18%, and Chairman Steve Parish, who holds 10%, as well as other minority investors like Robert Franco, who holds 5%.
In terms of voting rights, Textor, Harris, Blitzer and Parish each have 25% of voting rights, with Parish having the casting vote in his role as Chairman.
Blitzer also holds stakes in other European football clubs such as GD Estoril Praia in Portugal, AD Alcoron in Spain, SK Beveren in Belgium, FC Augsburg in Germany, ADO Den Haag in the Netherlands, and Brøndby in Denmark.
🔍 What Are UEFA’s MCO Rules?
UEFA’s MCO restrictions are outlined in Article 5 of the UEFA Club Competitions Regulations, and their goal is clear: to prevent two or more clubs under common control from participating in the same UEFA competition (Champions League, Europa League, or Conference League).
This prevents conflicts of interest—such as one owner influencing the outcome of a match that affects two of their clubs.
🧠 What Is a “Controlling Influence”?
UEFA defines “controlling influence” as a situation where a person or legal entity can directly or indirectly direct the decision-making of a football club. This includes formal rights like shareholding and board control, but also informal or de facto control.
Here’s how UEFA breaks it down, what I will refer to later as the "Substance Test".
✅ Criteria That Constitute Controlling Influence
A party is deemed to have a controlling influence over a club if any one of the following conditions is met:
1. Majority Voting Rights
The person or company holds a majority of the shareholders’ voting rights.
This is the most straightforward case: more than 50% of voting shares = control.
2. Power to Appoint or Remove Board Members
The party has the right to appoint or remove a majority of the club’s board.
Even without majority shareholding, control of board appointments puts a party in a position of power.
3. Significant Operational Influence
The party exercises a decisive influence over the club’s strategy, finances, or sporting operations.
This can be informal and doesn’t require ownership. For example:
Shared budgets, scouting networks, or marketing resources
Centralised decision-making across clubs in a group
Executive personnel working across multiple clubs
UEFA looks at substance over form—it doesn't matter how control is labelled, but how it functions.
4. Acting in Concert
The party works with others to collectively control voting rights.
Two minority shareholders with aligned voting agreements can jointly amount to a controlling interest.
🧾 Examples: What Might Trigger UEFA’s Concern?
Scenario | UEFA View |
A company owns 60% of two clubs | ❌ Control exists—only one may play |
Investor owns 25% but appoints the CEO | ❌ Control likely exists |
Two clubs share backroom staff but have separate boards and funding | ⚠️Might be OK, but UEFA would investigate |
A sponsor has naming rights but no management input | ✅ Not control |
UEFA considers:
Who makes strategic decisions?
Who approves budgets and player transfers?
Who has leverage via funding, branding, or staffing?
Even minority stakes (10–30%) can amount to control if combined with special rights or influence.
⚖️ Enforcement: What Happens If Control Is Found?
If UEFA finds that two clubs under common control qualify for the same competition, only one will be allowed to participate.
UEFA uses a priority system:
The club that finishes higher in its domestic league gets priority.
The other club may be reassigned to a lower-tier competition or barred entirely.
If both finish identically, UEFA uses sporting merit or coefficient rankings.
UEFA’s decisions are binding, and the burden is on the clubs to prove independence if there's a perceived link. Clubs which are part of an MCO model who look likely to qualify for UEFA competition, have until 31st March of that season to put arrangements into place to ensure appropriate sporting and legal independence, for example, the measures taken by Evangelos Marinakis to put his Forest shares into a blind trust when they looked likely to qualify for the Champions League alongside Olympiakos, who he also owns. INEOS also had to resort to a blind trust when Man Utd and Nice were both playing in the Europa League this season.
Blitzer’s stake in Brondby also has the potential to throw a spanner in the works, as it removes a potential solution under the rules, as Brondby have qualified for the Conference League, so Palace, as the lower ranked side would not be permitted to enter that competition as an alternative due to Blitzer’s controlling influence.
🔍 UEFA's Scrutiny in Practice
Recent examples:
✅ Red Bull Group (RB Leipzig and RB Salzburg) were allowed to compete after structural changes removed Red Bull’s direct control over both.
❌Brighton & Union Saint-Gilloise, both linked to Tony Bloom, were at risk in 2023, and UEFA stepped in to review their eligibility.
UEFA is increasingly cautious with complex ownership networks, particularly where private equity, consortiums, or family trusts blur lines of control.
🧭 Key Takeaways for Clubs and Investors
Point | Explanation |
Control ≠ Ownership Alone | Even without a majority stake, operational influence can trigger UEFA’s rules. |
UEFA applies a substance test | UEFA looks at who really makes decisions, not just legal structures. |
Disclosure is critical | Clubs must declare ownership and control relationships transparently. |
Shared owners = shared risk | MCO strategies must be designed to ensure UEFA compliance from day one. |
✍️ Final Thoughts
As multi-club ownership becomes more common, UEFA’s MCO rules are becoming more important—and more strictly enforced. “Controlling influence” is not just about shares or contracts; it’s about who pulls the strings behind a football club’s decisions.
For clubs and investors alike, staying within UEFA’s rules means structuring ownership with transparency, independence, and integrity—or risking exclusion from Europe’s biggest stage.
The primary question to be satisfied is whether Palace and OL share the same controlling influence, and whether that controlling influence has the capacity to affect the management of both clubs. The “substance test” appears to suggest that Eagle Football has no real operational influence over both clubs, and both clubs do not share scouting or technical data, do not trade players between each other regularly, nor share any coaching or backroom staff.
Whether this is sufficient to satisfy the substance test is unclear at this point, but the general interpretation of Textor’s role at Palace is that of a minority investor frustrated at this lack of influence on footballing matters. It is often quoted that he would like Palace to actively be part of an MCO model, but that Parrish has strongly pushed back on that idea. Also, the fact that Parrish has real operational control and influence could be decisive.
It also appears unfair that Palace are being potentially punished for their success, as they would have had no way of knowing that they would have had a realistic hope of European football by the 31st March deadline, as the FA Cup had only reached the 5th round stage at that date. UEFA (alongside the other major football regulatory bodies) have often been accused of enforcing the rules strictly on the smaller clubs, but failing to apply the same standard to the more prestigious clubs (e.g. Red Bull Leipzig and Manchester City), this is a chance for them to show a little flexibility in a situation where a club, and its fans face being punished harshly for their success.
*Full disclosure, the author is a Crystal Palace fan.
** Some parts of this blog have used AI for research purposes
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